We propose a new model for forming beliefs and learning about unknown probabilities (such as the probability of picking a red marble from a bag with an unknown distribution of coloured marbles). The most widespread model for such situations of 'radical uncertainty' is in terms of imprecise probabilities, i.e. representing the agent's knowledge as a set of probability measures. We add to this model a plausibility map, associating to each measure a plausibility number, as a way to go beyond what is known with certainty and represent the agent's beliefs about probability. There are a number of standard examples: Shannon Entropy, Centre of Mass etc. We then consider learning of two types of information: (1) learning by repeated sampling from the unknown distribution (e.g. picking marbles from the bag); and (2) learning higher-order information about the distribution (in the shape of linear inequalities, e.g. we are told there are more red marbles than green marbles). The first changes only the plausibility map (via a 'plausibilistic' version of Bayes' Rule), but leaves the given set of measures unchanged; the second shrinks the set of measures, without changing their plausibility. Beliefs are defined as in Belief Revision Theory, in terms of truth in the most plausible worlds. But our belief change does not comply with standard AGM axioms, since the revision induced by (1) is of a non-AGM type. This is essential, as it allows our agents to learn the true probability: we prove that the beliefs obtained by repeated sampling converge almost surely to the correct belief (in the true probability). We end by sketching the contours of a dynamic doxastic logic for statistical learning.
Introduction
Our goal in this paper is to propose a new model for learning a probabilistic distribution, in cases that are commonly characterized as those of "radical uncertainty" [32] or "Knightian uncertainty" [8] . As an example, consider an urn full of marbles, coloured red, green and black, but with an unknown distribution. What is then the probability of drawing a red marble? In such cases, when the agent's information is not enough to determine the probability distribution, she is typically left with a huge (usually infinite) set of probability assignments. If she never goes beyond what she knows, then her only 'rational' answer should be "I don't know": she in a state of ambiguity, and she should simply consider possible all distributions that are consistent with her background knowledge and observed evidence. Such a "Buridan's ass" type of rationality will not help our agent much in her decision problems. Our model allows the agent to go beyond what she knows with certainty, by forming rational qualitative beliefs about the unknown distribution, beliefs based on the inherent plausibility of each possible distribution. For this, we assume the agent is endowed with an initial plausibility map, assigning real numbers to the possible distributions. To form beliefs, the agent uses an AGM-type of plausibility maximization: she believes the most plausible distribution(s). So we equate "belief" with truth in all the most plausible worlds, whenever such most plausible worlds exist; while in more general settings, we follow the standard generalization of this notion of belief as "truth in all the worlds that are plausible enough". This is does not satisfy all the standard AGM axioms for belief revision. This is essential for learning the true probability from repeated sampling: since every sample is logically consistent with every distribution, an AGM learner would never change her initial belief! The second type of evidence (higher-order information about the distribution) induces a more familiar kind of update: the distributions that do not satisfy the new information (typically given in the former of linear inequalities) are simply eliminated, then beliefs are formed as before by focusing on the most plausible remaining distributions. This form of revision is known as AGM conditioning in Belief Revision Theory (and as update, or "public announcement", in Logic), and satisfies all the standard AGM axioms. The fact that in our setting there are two types of updates should not be so surprising. It is related to the fact that our static framework consists of two different semantic ingredients, capturing two different attitudes: the set of possible distributions (encoding the agent's knowledge about the correct distribution), and the plausibility map (encoding the agent's beliefs). The second type of (higher-order) information directly affects the agent's knowledge (by reducing the set of possibilities), and only indirectly her beliefs (by restricting the plausibility map to the new set, so beliefs are only updated with fit the new knowledge). Dually, the first type of (sampling) evidence acts directly affects the agent's beliefs (by changing the plausibility in the view of the sampling results), and only indirectly her knowledge (since e.g. she knows her new beliefs). The plan of this paper follows. We start by reviewing some basic notions, results and examples on probability distributions (Section 2). Then in Section 3, we define our main setting (probabilistic plausibility frames), consider a number of standard examples (Shannon Entropy, Center of Mass etc), then formalize the updates induced by the two types of new information, and prove our main result on convergencein-belief. In Section 4, we sketch the contours of a dynamic doxastic logic for statistical learning. We end with some concluding remarks and a brief comparison with other approaches to the same problem (Section 5).
Preliminaries and Notation
Take a finite set O = {o 1 , . . . , o n } and let M O = {µ ∈ [0, 1] O | ∑ o∈O µ(o) = 1} be the set of probability mass functions on O, which we identify with the corresponding probability functions on P(O). Let Ω = O ∞ = O N be the set of infinite sequences from O, which we shall refer to as observation streams. For any ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ N, we write ω i for the i-th component of ω, and ω i for its initial segment of length i, that is ω 1 , . . . , ω i . For each o ∈ O we define the sets o j to be the cylinders o j = {ω ∈ Ω | ω j = o} ⊆ Ω. Let A ⊆ P(Ω) be the σ -algebra of subsets of Ω generated by the cylinders. Every probability distribution µ ∈ M O induces a unique probability function,μ over (Ω, A ) by settingμ(o j ) = µ(o) which extends to all of A using independence. Let E be the subalgebra of A that is closed under complementation and finite unions and intersections of the cylinder sets. Then E will capture the set of events generated by finite sequences of observations. Example 1 Let O = {H, T } be the possible outcomes of a coin toss. Then Ω will be streams of Heads and Tails representing infinite tosses of the coin, e.g. HTTHHH.... And H j (res. T j ) will be the set of streams of observations in which the j-th toss of the coin has landed Heads (res. Tails). The set M O will be the set of possible biases of the coin.
Example 2 Let O = {R, B, G} be the possible outcomes for a draw from an urn filled with marbles, coloured Red, blue and Green. Then the set M O will be the set of different distribution of coloured marbles in the urn, Ω will be streams of R, B and G representing infinite draws from the urn, and R j (res. B j or G j ) will be the set of streams of draws in which the j-th draw is a Red (res. Blue or Green) marble.
Topology on M O Notice that a probability function µ ∈ M O , defined over the set O = {o 1 , . . . , o n }, can be identified with an n-dimensional vector (µ(o 1 ), . . . , µ(o n )), corresponding to the probabilities assigned to each o i respectively. Let
In the other direction every x ∈ D O defines a probability function x on O by setting x(o i ) = x i . This gives a one to one correspondence between M O and D O . There are various metric distances that can be defined on the space of probability measures over a (finite) set O many of which are known to induce the same topology. Here we will consider the standard topology of R n ,induced by the Euclidean metric: for x, y ∈ R n , put d( x, y) := ∑ n i=1 (x i − y i ) 2 ; a basis for the standard topology is given by the family of all open balls B ε ( x) centred at some point x ∈ R n with radius ε > 0; where
Proposition 1 For a finite set O, the set of probability mass functions on O, M O , is compact in the standard topology.
We will make use of the following well known facts: 
Probabilistic Plausibility Frames
A probabilistic plausibility frame over a finite set O is a structure F = (M, pla) where M is a subset of M O , called the set of "possible worlds", and pla : M O → [0, ∞) is a continuous function s.t. the derivative pla is also continuous. So our possible worlds are just mass functions on O. Here are some canonical examples of probabilistic plausibility frames:
• (a) Shannon Entropy as plausibility: Let pla : M O → [0, ∞) be given by the Shannon Entropy,
is a probabilistic plausibility frame. Here the most plausible distribution will be the one with highest Shannon entropy.
• (b) Centre of Mass as plausibility:
is a probabilistic plausibility frame. Here the plausibility ranking will be given in terms of typicality, and higher plausibility will be given to those probability functions that are closer to the average of M O .
Example 1. (continued).
In the absence of any information about the coin the set of possible biases will be the set M O of all probability mass functions on {H, T }. Then (M O , Ent) is a probabilistic plausibility frame, where the highest plausibility will be given to the distribution with highest entropy: the fair-coin distribution µ eq (since for every ν = µ eq we have Ent(ν) < Ent(µ eq )).
One of the main motivations for developing the setting that we investigate here is to capture the learning process as iterated revision that results from receiving new information. As was pointed out earlier one type of information essentially trims the space of possible probability measures by deleting certain candidates. There is however, a softer notion of revision, imposed by observations, that does not eliminate any candidate but rather changes the plausibility ordering over them. With this in mind, the next question we need to clarify is how the plausibility order is to be revised in light of new observations.
. When e ∈ E is fixed, this yields a conditional probability function pla e :
Conditioning plausibilities is clearly a higher-level, "plausubilistic" analogue of Bayesian conditions. It allows us to update the relative rankings of probability distributions, and thus captures a notion of learning through sampling. The next three results in Lemma 1, and Propositions 5 and 4 ensure that the conditionalisation of the plausibility function given by Definition 1 behaves correctly. In particular, Lemma 1 and Corollary 4 show that the properties of a plausibility function in our frames is preserved by the conditionalisation and Proposition 5 guarantees that the result of repeated conditionalisation is independent of the order. This is important as it ensures that what the agents come to believe is the result of what they learn and not the order in which they learn them.
Lemma 1
For each e ∈ E , the mapping F e : M O → [0, 1] defined as F e (µ) :=μ(e), is continuous with respect to µ.
Proposition 4
If pla is a plausibility function on M O and e ∈ E , then pla e is a plausibility function.
Proof. Follows from the definition using Lemma 1.
Proposition 5 For M O as above and pla : M O → [0, ∞) and e, e ∈ E : (pla e ) e = pla e∩e .
Proof. See appendix Example 1. (continued) Take the frame (M O , Ent) as before where M O is the set of all biases of the coin and Ent is the Shannon Entropy. Remember that µ eq is the unique maximiser of Ent on M O . Let e ∈ E , be the event that "the first three tosses of the coin have landed on Heads". After observing e, the new plausibility function is given by pla e (µ) = pla(µ)μ(e) = Ent(µ)μ(e). Thus the most plausible probability function will no more be µ eq and one with a bias towards Heads will become more plausible. Let µ 1 , µ 2 and µ 3 be such that µ 1 (Heads) = 3/4, µ 2 (Heads) = 0.8 and µ 3 (Heads) = 0.9 then it is easy to check that pla e (µ 1 ) < pla e (µ 2 ) > pla e (µ 3 ).
Our rule for updating plausibility relation weights the plausibility of each world with how much it respects the obtained evidence. In this way worlds that better correspond to the evidence are promoted in plausibility.
Proposition 6 Let M ⊆ M O be closed. Then for all e ∈ E , there exists some µ ∈ M with highest plausible (i.e. s.t. pla e (µ) ≥ pla e (µ ) for all µ ∈ M).
Proof. Using Lemma 1, the result follows as corollary of Proposition 3.
Definition 2 (Knowledge and Belief) Let P ⊆ M be a "proposition" (set of worlds) in a frame (M, pla). We say that P is known, and write K(P), if all M-worlds are in P; i.e. M ⊆ P. We say that P is believed in frame F = (M, pla), and write B(P), if and only if all "plausible enough" M-worlds are in P; i.e. {ν ∈ M | pla(ν) ≥ pla(µ)} ⊆ P for some µ ∈ M.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this is the standard notion of belief in Logic and Belief Revision Theory, see [2, 3, 4] for more justification of this definition.
Definition 3 (Two Forms of Conditionalisation) Let P ⊆ M O be a "proposition" (set of distributions).
For an event e ∈ E , we say that P is believed conditional on e in frame (M, pla), and write B(P|e), if and only if all M-worlds that are "plausible enough given e" are in P; i.e. {ν ∈ M | pla e (ν) ≥ e pla(µ)} ⊆ P for some µ ∈ M. For a proposition Q ⊆ M, we say that P is believed conditional on Q in frame (M, pla), and write B(P|Q), if and only if all plausible enough Q-worlds are in P; i.e. {ν ∈ Q | pla(ν) ≥ pla(µ)} ⊆ P for some µ ∈ Q.
It should be clear that B(P) is equivalent to B(P|Ω) and to B(P|M), where the set Ω of all observation streams represents the tautological event (corresponding to "no observation") and the set of M of all worlds represents the tautological proposition (corresponding to "no further higher-order information").
Belief is always consistent, and in fact it satisfies all the standard KD45 axioms of doxastic logic. Conditional belief is consistent whenever the evidence is (i.e. if e = / 0, then B(P|e) implies P = / 0, and similarly for B(P|Q)). In fact, when the set of worlds is closed, our definition is equivalent to the standard definition of belief (and conditional belief) as "truth in all the most plausible worlds":
Proof. See appendix. We are now in the position to look into the learnability of the correct probability distribution via plausibility-revision induced by repeated sampling.
Theorem 2 Take a finite set O of outcomes and consider a frame M = (M, pla) with M ⊆ M O . Suppose that the correct probability is µ ∈ M and that pla(µ) = 0. Then, with µ-probability 1, the agent's belief will eventually stay arbitrarily close to the correct probability distribution after enough many observations. More precisely, for every ε > 0, we have
(where recall that B ε (µ) = {ν ∈ M|d(µ, ν) < ε}).
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 1 Suppose that M ⊆ M O is finite, and the correct probability is µ ∈ M, with pla(µ) = 0. Then, with µ-probability 1, the agent's belief will settle on the correct probability distribution µ after finitely many observations:
Proof. Apply the previous Theorem to some ε > 0 small enough so that {ν | d(µ, ν) < ε} ∩ M = {µ}.
It is important to note the differences between our convergence result and the Savage style convergence results in the Bayesian literature that we mentioned in the Introduction. Savage's theorem only works for a finite set of hypotheses (corresponding to finite or countable M), so that the prior can assume a non-zero probability for each. Ours does not need this assumption and indeed, it works on the whole M O , since we don't put a probability over hypothesis (probability measures), but rather a plausibility. Also, in the case of a finite set of hypotheses/distributions, our approach converges in finitely many steps (while Savage's still converges only in the limit).
Towards a Logic of Statistical Learning
In this section we will develop the logical setting that can capture the dynamics of learning described above. As was originally intended our logical language will be designed as to accommodate both type of information, i.e. finite observations and higher order information expressed in terms of linear inequalities. As we pointed out at the start there is a fundamental distinction between these two types of information which is reflected in the way that ingredients of our logical language are interpreted. The observations are interpreted in a σ -algebra E ⊆ P(Ω) and are not themselves formulas in our logical language as they do not correspond to properties over the set of probability measures. The reason, as described before, lies in the fact that no finite sequence of observations can rule out any possible probability distribution and as such do not single out any subset of the domain. The formulas of our logical language will instead be statements concerning the probabilities of observations given in terms of linear inequalities and logical combinations thereof as well as the statements concerning the dynamics arising from such finite observations. Our set of propositional variables is the set of outcomes O = {o 1 , . . . , o n }. The set of formulas, in our language, FL LS , is inductively defined as Definition 5 (Two types of update) Let M = (M, pla, v) be a probabilistic plausibility model, let e ∈ E be a sampling event, and let P ⊆ M be a higher-order "proposition" (set of possible worlds, expressing some higher-order information about the world). The result of updating the model with sampling evidence e is the model M e = (M, pla e , v). In contrast, the result of updating the model with proposition P is the model M P = (P, pla, v).
Let M = (M, pla, v) be a probabilistic plausibility model. The semantics for formulas is given by inductively defining a satisfaction relation between worlds and formulas. In the definition, we use the notation
As is standard, for a model M = (M, pla, v), let φ M = {ν ∈ M | M , ν φ } and we shall say that a formula φ is valid in M if and only if M , µ φ for all µ ∈ M. Formula φ ∈ FL SL is valid (in the logic L SL ) if it is valid in every model M = (M, pla, v).
Proof. See appendix Proposition 9 Let o ∈ O and φ , θ , ξ ∈ FL SL . Then the following are valid formulas in L SL
Proof. Notice that at each model M and each world µ, w is interpreted as a probability mass function, namely µ itself. The rest follow easily from the definition. The dynamic operator in our logic that correspond to learning of higher order information, [φ ], is essentially an AGM type update and satisfies the corresponding axioms, that is:
Proposition 10 Let φ , θ , ξ ∈ FL SL . Then the following are valid formulas in L SL
• B(φ | φ )
Proof. Notice that the plausibility function induces a complete pre-order on the set of worlds. The validity of the above formulas over such frames as well as the correspondence between these formulas and the AGM axioms are given by Board in [5] . Finally, we give without proofs some validities regarding the interaction of the dynamic modalities with knowledge modality and (conditional) belief.
Proposition 11 Let φ , θ , ξ ∈ FL SL . Then the following are valid formulas in L SL
Conclusion and Comparison with Other Work
We studied forming beliefs about unknown probabilities in the situations that are commonly described as the those of radical uncertainty. The most widespread approach to model such situations of 'radical uncertainty' is in terms of imprecise probabilities, i.e. representing the agent's knowledge as a set of probability measures. There is extensive literature on the study of imprecise probabilities [6, 9, 15, 20, 33, 34, 35] and on different approaches for decision making based on them [7, 18, 28, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42] or to collapse the state of radical uncertainty by settling on some specific probability assignment as the most rational among all that is consistent with the agent's information. The latter giving rise to the area of investigation known as the Objective Bayesian account [22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 31] . A similar line of enquiry has been extensively pursued in economics and decision theory literature where the situation we are investigating here is referred to as Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity. This is the case when the decision maker has too little information to arrive at a unique prior. There has been different approaches in this literature to model these scenarios. These include, among others, the use of Choquet integration, for instance Heber and Strassen [16] , or Schmeidler [26, 27] , maxmin expected utility by Gilboa and Schmeidler [14] and smooth ambiguity model by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji [19] which employes second order probabilities or Al-Najjar's work [1] where he models rational agents who use frequentist models for interpreting the evidence and investigates learning in the long run. Cerreia-Vioglio et al [8] studies this problem in a formal setting similar to the one used here and axiomatizes different decision rules such as the maxmin model of Gilboa-Schmeidler and the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff e t al, and gives a overview of some of the different approaches in that literature. These approaches employ different mechanisms for ranking probability distribution compared to what we propose in this paper. Among these it is particularly worth pointing out the difference between our setting and those ranking probability distributions by their (second order) probabilities. In contrast, in our setting, it is only the worlds with highest plausibility that play a role in specifying the set of beliefs.
In particular, unlike the probabilities, the plausibilities are not cumulative in the sense that the distributions with low plausibility do not add up to form more plausible events as those with low probability would have had. This is a fundamental difference between our account and the account given in terms of second order probabilities. Another approach to deal with these scenarios in the Bayesian literature come from the series of convergence results collectively referred to as "washing out of the prior". The idea, which traces back to Savage, see [11, 40] , is that as long as one repeatedly updates a prior probability for an event through conditionalisation on new evidence, then in the limit one would surely converge to the true probability, independent of the initial choice of the prior. 3 Bayesians use these results to argue that an agent's choice of a probability distribution in scenarios such as our urn example is unimportant as long as she repeatedly updates that choice (via conditionalisation) by acquiring further evidence, for example by repeated sampling from the urn. However, it is clear that the efficiency of the agent's choice for the probability distribution, put in the context of a decision problem, depends strongly on how closely the chosen distribution tracks the actual. This choice is most relevant when the agents are facing a one-off decision problem, where their approximation of the true probability distribution at a given a point ultimately determines their actions at that point. Our approach, based on forming rational qualitative beliefs about probability (based on the agent's assessment of each distribution plausibility), does not seem prone to these objections. The agent does "the best she can" at each moment, given her evidence, her higher-order information and her background assumptions (captured by her plausibility map). Thus, she can solve one-off decision problems to the best of her ability. And, by updating her plausibility with new evidence, her beliefs are still guaranteed to converge to the true distribution (if given enough evidence) in essentially all conditions (-including in the cases that evade Savage-type theorems). We end by sketching the contours of a dynamic doxastic logic for statistical learning. Our belief operator satisfies all the axioms of standard doxastic logic, and one form of conditional belief (with propositional information) satisfies the standard AGM axioms for belief revision. But the other form of conditioning (with sampling evidence) does not satisfy these axioms, and this is in fact essential for our convergence results.
Definition 1 For µ ∈ M, we define the set of µ-normal observations as the set of infinite sequences from O for which the limiting frequencies of each o i correspond to µ(o i ) and we will denote this set by Ω µ :
Proposition 12 For every probability function µ,μ(Ω µ ) = 1. Hence, if µ is the true probability distribution over O, then almost all observable infinite sequence from O will be µ-normal.
Proof. Let ∆ = {ω ∈ Ω | ∃i ∈ N µ(ω i ) = 0}. Using the law of large numbers it is enough to show that µ(∆) = 0. To see this let µ(o) = 0 then
The result then follows from finiteness of O.
Lemma 1 For 0 < p 1 , . . . , p n < 1 with ∑ p i = 1, the function f ( x) = Π n i=1 x p i i on domain x ∈ { z ∈ (0, 1) n | ∑ z i = 1} has x = p as its unique maximizer on M O .
Proof. First we notice that f ( x) ≥ 0 on M O = { z ∈ [0, 1] n | ∑ z i = 1} and by Propositions 1 and 3 f has a maximum on M O . For any point z ∈ M O with any z i = 0 (or z i = 1) f ( z) = 0 thus f reaches its maximum on { z ∈ (0, 1) n | ∑ z i = 1}. To show the result, we will show that log( f ( x)) has x = p as its unique maximizer on this domain. The result then follows from noticing that f (x) ≥ 0 and the monotonicity of log function on R + . To maximise log( f ( x)) subject to condition ∑ i x i = 1 we use Lagrange multiplier methods: let
Setting partial derivatives of G equal to zero we get,
which gives p i = λ x i . Inserting this in the condition ∑ i p i = 1 we get λ ∑ i x i = 1 and using ∑ i x i = 1 we get λ = 1 and thus x i = p i . Since f has a maximum on this domain and the Lagrange multiplier method gives a necessary condition for the maximum, any point x that maximises f should satisfy the condition x i = p i and thus p is the unique maximiser for f . Proof of Theorem 2: Proof. Since µ(Ω µ ) = 1 (by the Strong Law of Large Numbers), it is enough to show that ∀ε > 0∀ω ∈ Ω µ ∃K ∀m ≥ K : B({ν|d(µ, ν) < ε} | ω m ) holds in M.
Let us fix some ε > 0 and some ω ∈ Ω µ . We need to show that, there exists ν ∈ M such that for all large enough m, for any ξ ∈ M if pla(ξ | ω m ) ≥ pla(ν | ω m ), then d(ξ , µ) < ε. To show this, we will prove a stronger claim, namely that:
